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Hedge funds have grown rapidly in the last few years.1  Eight thousand
eight hundred hedge funds are believed to exist today with aggregate assets total-
ing upwards of $1.2 trillion.2  Major hedge fund losses, such as that of Long-
Term Capital Management, which lost $4 billion in five weeks,3 have brought
increased attention to a field that is known for high-risk investment strategies
and high returns,4 as well as for being secretive,5 unregulated,6 and accessible
only to wealthy investors.7  The industry has seen an increase in institutional
investors and many people fear that “retailization” of hedge funds is opening up
the playing field to a broader audience.8  In response to these changes in the hedge
fund industry and the view that there has been an increase in fraudulent activi-
ties among hedge fund investment advisers,9 the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (“SEC”)10 has been studying the need for regulation and investigating
methods to increase oversight of hedge funds.11  There is a growing divide be-
tween those who perceive hedge fund growth as a black hole in dire need of
federal regulation12 and those who assert that the absence of federal regulation is
the nature of the industry, and the reason why hedge funds generate such high
returns.  Furthermore, those that make the latter contention believe that our fi-
nancial markets rely upon the absence of federal regulation of hedge funds.13
1. Regulation of Hedge Funds: Hearing Before the U.S. S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter Cox] (statement of Christopher Cox, Chairman, Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n) (estimating that hedge fund assets have increased 3,000 percent over the last sixteen years); see
also Dale A. Oesterle, Regulating Hedge Funds (Public Law and Legal Theory, Working Paper Series
No. 71 & Center for Interdisciplinary Law & Policy Studies Working Paper Series No. 47, 2006), availa-
ble at http://ssrn.com/abstract=913045 [hereinafter Oesterle]; David A. Katz and Laura A. McIntosh,
Advice on Coping With Hedge Fund Activism, N.Y.L.J., May 25, 2006, at 5.
2. Cox, supra note 1.
3. Id. (“Had the Federal Reserve Bank of New York not intervened to organize a $3.6 billion bailout by the
fund’s creditor banks, the bankruptcy of LTCM ‘could have potentially impaired the economies of many
nations, including our own.’ ” (quoting then Federal Reserve Bank Chairman Alan Greenspan)).
4. See  Oesterle, supra note 1.
5. Id.; see also, e.g., Joseph Nocera, Offering Up an Even Dozen Odds and Ends, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24,
2005, at C1.
6. See  Oesterle, supra note 1.  Hedge funds owe much of their success to exemptions from federal regulation
on formation, organization, and trading practices. Id. 
7. Id. (“People who distrust the wealthy elite see hedge funds as the exclusive playground of a very wealthy
elite class of investors.”).
8. See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054,
72,057–72,058 (Dec. 10, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279) [hereinafter Final Rule].  Institu-
tional investors include investment companies and investment banks, private and public pension plans,
endowments, and foundations. Id.
9. Id.
10. The SEC is responsible for regulating money managers. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 (2000).
11. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 877 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
12. See generally Final Rule, supra note 8.
13. See  Oesterle, supra note 1.
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In Goldstein v. SEC, the U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia
Circuit, was called upon to review the SEC’s Hedge Fund Rule, which at-
tempted to regulate hedge funds under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940
(“Advisers Act”), and required most hedge fund investment advisers to register
with the SEC.14  The D.C. Circuit addressed the issue of whether the term “cli-
ent” in Section 203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act could be construed to include the
“shareholders, limited partners, members, or beneficiaries” of a hedge fund.15
Previously, the SEC had interpreted the term client to include only the funds of
investment advisers and not the funds’ investors.16  The Goldstein court, how-
ever, threw out the SEC’s Hedge Fund Rule and unanimously held that the SEC
had exceeded its statutory authority, and that its interpretation of the term client
in Section 203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act was arbitrary and unreasonable.17  This
case comment contends that while the court’s decision to vacate the Hedge Fund
Rule was correct, it resulted in much confusion among hedge fund investment
advisers who had registered to comply with the Hedge Fund Rule because the
court failed to delineate the protections that remained for newly registered hedge
fund investment advisers and the procedures for deregistration.  In vacating the
Hedge Fund Rule, the court also threw out a number of amendments that were
created to protect hedge fund investment advisers who were forced to register
under the new rule.18  The entire rule and related amendments (the “entire
adopting release”) protected newly registered hedge fund investment advisers by
relieving them of the immediate need to comply with the books and records and
compensation requirements, among other things.  By vacating the entire adopting
release the court sowed confusion among hedge fund investment advisers.
Previously, under Section 203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act, hedge fund invest-
ment advisers who had fewer than fifteen clients were exempt from registration
with the SEC.19  The SEC had interpreted the term client to mean the entity,
rather than the individual investors of the entity.20  In 2004, with a view to-
ward increasing federal regulation of hedge funds and their investment advisers,
the SEC sought comments from the industry regarding its proposed Hedge Fund
Rule.21  The SEC received 161 letters from investors, hedge fund advisers, other
investment advisers, trade associations, and law firms.  In total, forty-two did
not take a position on registration, thirty-six approved the rule to increase hedge
14. Goldstein , 451 F.3d at 874.
15. Id.  (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-2(a) (2007)).
16. Id. at 876.
17. Id. at 881–84.
18. See  Final Rule, supra note 8.
19. See 15 U.S.C. § 80(b)-3(b)(3) (2000).
20. Goldstein , 451 F.3d at 876.
21. See  Final Rule, supra note 8.
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fund regulation, and eighty-three dissented.22  Despite strong opposition from the
hedge fund community and two dissenting commissioners regarding the registra-
tion requirement and its costs, dubious ability to prevent fraud, and intrusive-
ness,23 on December 1, 2004, the SEC adopted the Hedge Fund Rule and related
amendments that mandated that private funds “look through” the entity and
count the “shareholders, limited partners, and beneficiaries of the fund” as “cli-
ents.”24  This adoption forced hedge fund investment advisers to register with the
SEC before February 1, 2006,25 effectively eliminating their prior exemption
from registration under the Advisers Act and abolishing a 1985 statutory safe
harbor.
Plaintiffs Philip Goldstein, Kimball & Winthrop (an investment advisory
firm co-owned by Goldstein), and Opportunity Partners L.P. (a hedge fund in
which Kimball & Winthrop was the investment adviser) (collectively, “Gold-
stein”) filed a petition for review of the SEC’s Hedge Fund Rule.26  Plaintiffs
argued that the SEC’s regulation of hedge funds under the Hedge Fund Rule was
contrary to Congressional intent, and that the SEC’s attempt to redefine the term
client exceeded its statutory authority.27  Furthermore, plaintiffs contended that
the SEC’s interpretation of the statutory language was unreasonable and arbi-
trary for a number of reasons.28  First, the SEC did not provide evidence of a
change in the nature of the relationship between hedge fund investment advisers
and clients of funds to justify departing from its prior usage of the term.29  Also,
the SEC failed to provide a reasonable justification for why client should mean
something different for the purpose of the hedge fund investment adviser exemp-
tion than what it means for other provisions of the same act.30  According to the
plaintiffs, the SEC’s usage of the term client was illogical in that a hedge fund
investment adviser does not have a direct and personal relationship with a secur-
ity holder and cannot owe fiduciary duties to both the entity and the security
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Goldstein , 451 F.3d at 877; 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-2(a) (2007).
25. See  Final Rule, supra note 8.
26. See Initial Brief: Appellant-Petitioner, Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (No. 04-1434).
Plaintiff filed a petition with both the District Court and the Court of Appeals because of ambiguity
regarding the review process.  It is generally said that review by the Court of Appeals is proper because it
saves time and money.  Both parties agreed that the petition should be reviewed by the Court of Appeals.
Furthermore, the Advisers Act provides for review in a federal appellate court and case law indicates that
ambiguities should be resolved in favor of appellate review.  In order to save time and meet the grievance
deadline, a petition was also filed with the District Court on the chance that the judicial system directed
the petition to the District Court. Id.
27. Id. at 27.
28. Id. at 24–25.
29. Id. at 40.
30. Id. at 38–39.
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holders of that entity because it would create a conflict of interest.31  Further-
more, the SEC’s evaluation was “arbitrary” and “capricious.”32  Finally, plain-
tiffs argued that if the SEC desired to reinterpret the term client or increase
regulation of hedge fund investment advisers, it must do so by appealing to Con-
gress to amend the Advisers Act.33
The SEC argued that the term client in the Advisers Act was ambiguous
and that the legislative history did not shed further light on the issue.34  Accord-
ing to the SEC, the method of counting clients under the Advisers Act was not
determined by Congress, and therefore the SEC had the regulatory authority to
interpret the meaning of the term.35  In addition, the SEC asserted that plain-
tiffs’ argument regarding fiduciary duties was invalid because the SEC had
made clear that there would be no change in fiduciary duties under the new
rule.36  The SEC asserted that the previous rule was inconsistent with the pur-
pose of the exemption.37  The growth of the industry, the retailization of hedge
funds, and an increase in fraud in the industry further necessitated the rule
change.38  Finally, the SEC argued that it had a right to eliminate the exemption
created by Congress in order to safeguard hedge fund investors and the securities
markets.39
After an extensive review of the meaning of the term client in the Advisers
Act, the court vacated the SEC’s Hedge Fund Rule.40  First, the court made clear
that just because the term client is not defined in the Advisers Act does not mean
the term is ambiguous and that the SEC may impart whatever meaning it
chooses.41  Rather, the meaning of the term must be gleaned from context, the
statutory scheme, and the purpose for which it was implemented.42  The court
held that the legislative history surrounding the exemption provided the court
with a clear indication of Congress’s intent not to regulate hedge fund investment
advisers.
31. See Reply Brief of Petitioner at 8–9, Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (No. 04–1434).
32. See Initial Brief: Appellant-Petitioner, supra note 26, at 24.
33. See Reply Brief of Petitioner, supra note 31, at 3.
34. See Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Respondent at 15, Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873
(D.C. Cir. 2006) (No. 04–1434).
35. Id. at 20–21.
36. Id. at 18.
37. Id. at 40.
38. See id. at 9–11.
39. Id. at 7.
40. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
41. Id. at 878 (“The lack of a statutory definition of a word does not necessarily render the meaning of a word
ambiguous, just as the presence of a definition does not necessarily make the meaning clear.”).
42. Id.
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Prior to 1970, investment advisers could advise an unlimited number of
investment companies without becoming subject to registration, provided they
were only advising investment companies.  In 1970, Congress amended Section
203 and eliminated a separate registration exemption, which the court explained
would have been superfluous if Congress had deemed investors to be clients of
advisers.43
The fact that Congress did not intend investors of hedge funds to be counted
as “clients” is further indicated by Congress’s definition of investment adviser in
the Advisers Act.44  The Advisers Act defines an investment adviser as “any per-
son who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising others, either di-
rectly or through publications or writings, as to the value of securities or as to the
advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities.”45  The court ex-
plained that an investor in a fund does not receive advice directly from the ad-
viser in the sense that the adviser does not tell the investor how to spend his
money because the investor has already spent his money when he invested in the
fund.46  Rather, the adviser advises the fund on what to do with its capital.47  If
the adviser is not advising the investor directly, it is impossible for the investor to
be a client of the adviser.48
The court held that in the Hedge Fund Rule, the SEC had arbitrarily de-
parted from its prior interpretation of the term client.49  In 1997, the SEC issued
a regulation explaining that an investment adviser has no duty to consider the
needs of individual investors when investing the fund’s capital.50  Therefore, a
fund’s investors could not be deemed to be clients.  Furthermore, in 1985, the
SEC adopted a safe harbor for general partners of limited partnerships and
stated that when “an adviser to an investment pool manages the assets of the pool
on the basis of investment objectives of the participants as a group, it appears
appropriate to view the pool—rather than each participant—as a client of the
adviser.”51  Since 1985, this safe harbor has been expanded to include other types
43. Id. at 879 (“Congress eliminated a separate exemption from registration for advisers who advised only
investment companies and explicitly made the fewer-than-fifteen-clients exemption unavailable to such
advisers.” (citing Investment Company Amendment Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91–547, § 24, 84 Stat.
1413, 1430 (1970))).
44. Goldstein , 451 F.3d at 879.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(11) (2000).
46. Goldstein , 451 F.3d at 879–80.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 880.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 880 (citing Status of Investment Advisory Programs Under the Investment Company Act of 1940,
62 Fed. Reg. 15,098, 15,102 (Mar. 31, 1997)).
51. Goldstein , 451 F.3d at 880 (quoting Definition of “Client” of Investment Adviser for Certain Purposes
Relating to Limited Partnerships, 50 Fed. Reg. 8740, 8741 (proposed Mar. 5, 1985)).
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of entities.52  Because the SEC failed to provide evidence indicating a change in
the nature of the advisory relationship between a hedge fund investment adviser
and investors to justify such a radical departure from the rule, the court ruled its
actions were arbitrary and unreasonable.53
The court also noted that a hedge fund investment adviser cannot owe fidu-
ciary duties to both the fund and the individual investors in a fund since it would
create a conflict of interest.54  The court was unimpressed by the SEC’s argument
that the Hedge Fund Rule would not affect the fiduciary duties owed to a client
because, according to the SEC, its new usage of the term would only be applicable
to the method of counting clients for purposes of Section 203(b)(3).55  The court
held that the term client could not have two entirely different meanings within
the same act.56
Lastly, the court rejected the SEC’s contention that the Hedge Fund Rule
fostered Congress’s policy goals under the Advisers Act.57  Essentially, the SEC
argued that Congress did not choose to regulate hedge funds because they were
not national in scope.58  The court held that this was not clearly Congress’s intent
and furthermore, even if it was, it was not the number of investors in a hedge
fund that was the critical factor in assessing its importance to the financial mar-
kets, but rather the amount of assets in the fund.59
In sum, the court vacated and remanded the Hedge Fund Rule because the
SEC had arbitrarily departed from its prior interpretation of the term client60
and its interpretation under the Hedge Fund Rule was unreasonable.61  The
court stated that “the SEC may not accomplish its objective of more comprehen-
sive regulation of hedge funds by a manipulation of meaning.”62
This case comment contends that while the court’s decision to vacate the
Hedge Fund Rule was correct, its holding was too broad.  The court essentially
“threw the baby out with the bathwater” by overturning the Hedge Fund Rule
and its registration requirements and not addressing the entire adopting release.
In failing to address the entire adopting release, the court stripped newly regis-
tered hedge fund investment advisers of the protections afforded to them under
52. Id.
53. Id. at 882–83.
54. Id. at 881.
55. Id. at 882.
56. Id. (“[W]e ordinarily presume that the same words used in different parts of a statute have the same
meaning.”).
57. Id. at 883.
58. Id .
59. Id .
60. Id. at 883–84.
61. Id. at 881.
62. Id. at 882.
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the Hedge Fund Rule.  The court should have addressed the entire adopting re-
lease and made clear what protections would exist for newly registered hedge
fund investment advisers and what the legal procedure for deregistration would
entail.
As a result of the court’s expansive decision in Goldstein  to vacate the en-
tire adopting release, rather than addressing the related amendments, many
hedge fund investment advisers found themselves newly registered without the
protections promised to them under the Hedge Fund Rule.  The decision led to
something short of pandemonium in the hedge fund world.  After Goldstein ,
hedge fund investment advisers questioned whether it was prudent to deregister
immediately to avoid being in non-compliance or whether to remain registered in
case the SEC requested a rehearing of the court or submitted a petition for certio-
rari to the Supreme Court.  Such a rehearing or grant of certiorari would lead to
the obvious potential of overruling the decision.
On August 7, 2006, SEC Chairman Christopher Cox issued a statement
indicating that since the Goldstein decision was unanimous and based on multi-
ple grounds, the SEC would not pursue further judicial action because it believed
it stood little chance of obtaining a favorable decision.63  However, because of the
court’s decision, legal questions remain regarding the elimination of protections
related to issues such as the transitional books and records requirement, the dere-
gistration process, and the performance based compensation allowances, which
were promised to newly registered hedge fund investment advisers.
Because Goldstein  declined to render guidance on the status of the rule
amendments, there was a great deal of ambiguity for hedge fund investment
advisers regarding the registration and compliance process and the law gov-
erning hedge fund investment advisers.  In the aftermath of the decision,64 the
American Bar Association (“ABA”), Section of Business Law, submitted a letter65
dated July 31, 2006, to the Division of Investment Management of the SEC
requesting that the SEC clarify and provide interpretative advice regarding the
amendments promulgated in connection with the Hedge Fund Rule, which were
vacated by default.
One gray area addressed by the ABA letter involved the books and records
requirement.66  Under the prior rules, Section 204–2(a)(16) of the Advisers Act
required registered hedge fund investment advisers to maintain books and
63. Statement of Chairman Cox Concerning the Decision of the U.S. Court Of Appeals in Goldstein,
Et Al. v. SEC, 2006 SEC NEWS DIG. 152 (Aug. 8, 2006) [hereinafter Statement of Chairman Cox].
64. Goldstein , 451 F.3d at 873.
65. Letter from Paul N. Roth & Jeffrey E. Tabak, Chair & Co-Chair, ABA Subcomm. on Private Inv.
Entities, to Robert E. Plaze, Assoc. Dir. of the Div. of Inv. Mgmt., SEC (July 31, 2006) (on file with
author), available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/committees/CL410000pub/comments/2006073100
0000.pdf [hereinafter ABA Letter].
66. Id. at 2–3.
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records used to determine performance for marketing and advertising purposes.67
Amendment 203(b)(3)–1 of the Advisers Act created a transitional exception,
whereby newly registered hedge fund investment advisers would not be required
to maintain records of fund performance for any period ending prior to February
1, 2005.  Now, because of the Goldstein decision, without this transitional ex-
emption many newly registered hedge fund investment advisers may not be in
compliance with the Advisers Act.
Another problem created by Goldstein, and also discussed in the ABA letter,
deals with the issue of performance-based compensation.68  Section 205(a)(1) of
the Advisers Act prohibited registered investment advisers from receiving com-
pensation based on the capital gains of the fund unless receiving it from a “quali-
fied client.”69  The Hedge Fund Rule amended this rule and grandfathered
existing performance-based compensation plans for hedge fund investment advis-
ers not receiving compensation from qualified clients who were forced to register
under the Hedge Fund Rule.  When the court vacated the Hedge Fund Rule, it
eliminated this protection, thereby potentially causing another compliance prob-
lem for many newly registered hedge fund investment advisers.
The issues discussed above are only a few examples of the potential problems
and ambiguity resulting from the court’s expansive decision.  Other gray areas
include the treatment of offshore hedge fund investment advisers, extension of the
distribution period of audited financials for fund of funds (who rely on audited
financials from the funds they invest in to prepare their own audited financials),
and issues related to withdrawal from registration (Form ADV–W and balance
sheet requirements).70
67. 17 C.F.R. § 275.204–2(a)(16) (2007).
68. Id.
69. Id. at § 275.205–3(d)(1) (2007).  A qualified client is defined as follows:
(i) A natural person who or a company that immediately after entering into the contract has
at least $750,000 under the management of the investment adviser;
(ii) A natural person who or a company that the investment adviser entering into the
contract (and any person acting on his behalf) reasonably believes, immediately prior to
entering into the contract, either: (A) Has a net worth (together, in the case of a natural
person, with assets held jointly with a spouse) of more than $1,500,000 at the time the
contract is entered into; or (B) Is a qualified purchaser as defined in section 2(a)(51)(A) of
the Investment Company Act of 1940 at the time the contract is entered into; or
(iii) A natural person who immediately prior to entering into the contract is: (A) An execu-
tive officer, director, trustee, general partner, or person serving in a similar capacity, of the
investment adviser; or (B) An employee of the investment adviser (other than an employee
performing solely clerical, secretarial or administrative functions with regard to the invest-
ment adviser) who, in connection with his or her regular functions or duties, participates in
the investment activities of such investment adviser, provided that such employee has been
performing such functions and duties for or on behalf of the investment adviser, or substan-
tially similar functions or duties for or on behalf of another company for at least 12 months.
70. See  ABA Letter, supra note 65.
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On August 1, 2006, the Division of Investment Management of the SEC
responded to the ABA.71  The Division of Investment Management stated that it
would not recommend enforcement action against hedge fund investment advis-
ers not in compliance with the rules if they would have been in compliance under
the Hedge Fund Rule and related amendments.72  While this alleviates a degree
of uncertainty left by Goldstein , there is still ambiguity that must be resolved.
As a result of the court’s decision and the increased attention this case has
brought to the area, it is not clear what the law on hedge funds is, nor is it clear
what the future holds for hedge fund registration and regulation.  However, the
Goldstein  decision did make apparent that the SEC cannot arbitrarily impose
unreasonable requirements on hedge fund investment advisers, nor may it exceed
its statutory grant of power.  In a recent address to the U.S. Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Commissioner Cox indicated that in the
aftermath of Goldstein , the SEC will continue to seek ways to regulate hedge
funds including limiting access to retail investors by increasing the minimum net
worth requirements.  He noted, however, that some action may need to be
legislative.73
By nature, hedge funds are high-risk investments and employ secretive
trading strategies.74  Investors in hedge funds are high net worth, sophisticated
clients who are aware of their potentially risky, yet lucrative investments.75
Heavy regulation has the potential to decrease foreign investment and may create
a false sense of security for investors when regulation may not in fact prevent
fraud.76  There are other ways to protect investors, such as increasing the mini-
mum net worth requirements and requesting simple notice filings of hedge
funds.77  But because of the expansive nature of the court’s decision in Goldstein,
and the ambiguity it created, there has been an increased focus on hedge fund
related activity ultimately resulting in a frenzy of unjustified regulatory propos-
als.78  As a result of the court’s expansive decision, it is not clear what protections
exist for newly registered hedge fund investment advisers.
71. Response Letter from Robert E. Plaze, Assoc. Dir. of the Div. of Inv. Mgmt. of the SEC, to Paul N. Roth
& Jeffrey E. Tabak, Chair & Co-Chair, ABA Subcomm. on Private Inv. Entities (Aug. 10, 2006).
72. Id.
73. See Statement of Chairman Cox, supra note 63.
74. See  Oesterle, supra note 1, at 10–11.
75. Id.
76. See  Final Rule, supra note 8.
77. See id. at 72,089–72,098 (Comm’rs Glassman and Atkins, dissenting).
78. See e.g., Securities and Exchange Commission Authority Restoration Act, H.R. 5712, 109th Cong.
(2006); Hedge Fund Study Act, H.R. 6079, 109th Cong. (2006).
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